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Mathematical risk analysis was used in Apollo, but it gave unacceptably pessimistic results 
and was discontinued. Shuttle was designed without using risk analysis, under the assumption 
that good engineering would make it very safe. This approach led to an unnecessarily risky 
design, which directly led to the Shuttle tragedies. Although the Challenger disaster was 
directly due to a mistaken launch decision, it might have been avoided by a safer design. The 
ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the Apollo era decision to abandon risk analysis.  
Nomenclature 
CAIB = Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
GAO = Government Accountability Office 
PRA = Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
I. Introduction 
HIS paper discusses the changing views of risk over time in NASA’s Apollo and Space Shuttle programs. Risk 
was an acknowledged problem early in Apollo, but risk estimates were disturbingly high and risk analysis was 
discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided or distorted in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design.   
The story of the Challenger tragedy is well known but not well understood. The O-rings in the Shuttle solid rocket 
boosters had experienced erosion on previous flights and the weather was much colder than for earlier launches. The 
engineers were unable to prove to management that the launch was unsafe. They were overruled and the disaster 
followed. The accident investigation focused on the events immediately preceding the tragedy, finding a pressure to 
launch, communication problems between management and engineering, and the “normalization of deviance” shown 
by the neglect of the increasing erosion of the O-rings. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the badly 
mistaken decision to launch, but a more fundamental cause was the poor safety and reliability of the Shuttle design 
itself. Before Challenger, management thought that the chance of an accident was 1 in 100,000. Afterwards, 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The number of planned Shuttle 
flights was greatly reduced. Attempts were made to strengthen the NASA safety culture, but the Columbia tragedy, 
due to recurring but neglected ice damage to the heat shields, was again attributed to poor safety culture and the 
normalization of deviance. The second tragedy again confirmed the Shuttle’s roughly 1 in 100 risk and the Shuttle 
program was ultimately terminated. Later launch designs reverted to the safer Apollo configuration, with a hardened 
capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engine. The ultimate cause of the 
Challenger tragedy was neglect of risk in Shuttle design.  
II. The Apollo program 
The Apollo program grew out of the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union. In 1957 the Soviet Union 
launched the first man-made satellite, then placed the first animal, first man, and first woman in orbit, and also 
conducted the first space walk. The Soviet launch of Sputnik was a significant cold war event, since it demonstrated 
that the Soviets had intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kennedy was elected president after promising to close the 
“missile gap.” He had to deal with confrontations over Berlin and Cuba and Khrushchev’s promise that “we will bury 
you.” Apollo was motivated by the need to surpass Soviet space successes that implied US weakness. In 1961 before 
a joint session of Congress, Kennedy stated that, “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, 
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth.”1 Kennedy mentioned 
safety, but it was third after the decade time limit and the moon destination. The goal was set and achieved and the 
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Soviets were decisively beaten in the space race. The first moon landing will be remembered as a space milestone 
long after the cold war is a footnote to history.  
The Apollo program was a success, but not a perfect success. Apollo 1 was a tragedy with an amazingly negligent 
cause, that the possibility of a fire was simply dismissed. Apollo 13 was a close call that demonstrated the high risk 
inherent in complex systems. Apollo 13 returned without landing and the last three Apollo flights were cancelled to 
support Skylab and to divert the NASA budget to new programs. The Apollo program achieved only six of the ten 
planned moon landings. 
A. Appreciating and deemphasizing risk in Apollo 
Joseph Shea, the Apollo program manager, chaired the initial Apollo systems architecting team. The “calculation 
was made by its architecting team, assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done 
as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth. Even to 
do that well, launch vehicle failure rates would have to be half those ever achieved and with untried propulsion 
systems.”2  
The high risk of the moon landing was understood by the astronauts. Apollo 11's Command Module pilot Mike 
Collins described it as a “fragile daisy chain of events.”3 Collins and Neil Armstrong, the first man to step on the 
moon, rated their chances of survival at 50-50.4  
The awareness of risk let to intense focus on reducing risk. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing 
success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the 
norm of human capabilities. ”2  
However, this appreciation of the risk was not considered appropriate for the public. During Apollo, NASA 
conducted a full Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assess the likelihood of success in “landing a man on the 
Moon and returning him safely to Earth.” The PRA indicated the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The 
NASA Administrator felt that if the results were made public, “the numbers could do irreparable harm.” The PRA 
effort was cancelled and NASA stayed away from numerical risk assessment as a result.5  
B. Apollo 1 
During a simulated countdown, liftoff, and flight conducted in the Apollo 1 capsule on the launch pad, the 
astronauts reported a fire. The three astronauts died from smoke and flames before escape or rescue was possible. 
National news commentators and senators blamed the inflexible, meaningless goal of putting a man on the moon 
before 1970.  
Joseph Shea recalled a fire discussion a few months before, “I got a little annoyed, and I said, ‘Look, there's no 
way there's going to be a fire in that spacecraft unless there's a spark or the astronauts bring cigarettes aboard.’”6 
“Deeply involved in the investigation of the 1967 Apollo 1 fire, Shea suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the 
stress that he suffered. He was removed from his position and left NASA shortly afterwards.”7  
The NASA administrator established an all government, nearly all NASA review board that limited outside access 
to information. The review board found that:   
"The fire in Apollo 204 was most probably brought about by some minor malfunction or failure of equipment or wire 
insulation. This failure, which most likely will never be positively identified, initiated a sequence of events that 
culminated in the conflagration. Those organizations responsible for the planning, conduct and safety of this test failed to 
identify it as being hazardous. … The Command Module contained many types and classes of combustible material in 
areas contiguous to possible ignition sources. … The Command Module Environmental Control System design provides 
a pure oxygen atmosphere. ... This atmosphere presents severe fire hazards.”8  
The review board recommended that NASA continue the program to the reach the moon by 1969, but make safety 
more important than schedule. Congress investigated and noted that there was no investigation of possible weakness 
in the managerial structure causing the failure. However, they confirmed the review board’s recommendation to 
proceed to the moon with safety first.  
The cause of the Apollo 1 failure was a failure to anticipate a known hazard. Astronaut Frank Borman, on the 
NASA review board, stated "none of us gave any serious consideration to a fire in the spacecraft."8  The Apollo 1 fire 
was unexpected, unpredicted even though several fires in other pure oxygen atmospheres had caused deaths. Later 
spacecraft designs used Earth normal atmosphere, considered the combustibility of materials, and developed 
capabilities and procedures for escape and rescue.  
After the tragedy of the Apollo 1 fire, the reliability of Apollo was made central by an engineering culture that 
encouraged an environment of open communications, attention to detail, and ability to challenge technical 
assumptions. “Anyone could challenge a design at any time. … Reliability was a concern at all levels.”9  
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C. Apollo 11  
Apollo 11 successfully landed on the moon on the first attempt in 1969. The US achieved a fabulous goal and the 
Soviets were decisively beaten in the cold war space race.  
A major factor in the success of Apollo was the extreme attention paid to reliability and crew safety with emphasis 
on communications, teamwork, and paying attention to details. The policy was to speak and to listen, to always bring 
up issues that were not fully understood. Apollo had an unusual and pervasive awareness of risk. The Apollo success 
showed that by intense effort, a dedicated organization can achieve results far beyond reasonable expectation.  
D. Apollo 13 
Apollo 13 was on its way to the moon when crew heard a loud bang and reported, "Okay, Houston. Hey, we've 
got a problem here." Panel readings indicated a loss of fuel cell oxygen and the attitude control thrusters were firing 
to counteract oxygen venting into space. As both oxygen tanks became empty, the crew sought refuge in the lunar 
module.8  
The investigation identified the physical causes and the sequence of events of the failure. Oxygen tank 2 had two 
protective thermostat switches on its heater that were designed for 28 volts dc, but a procedure change allowed them 
to be operated at 65 volts dc during tank pressurization. When the tank temperature rose above limits during 
pressurization a few days before launch, the thermostat switches were fused closed and failed to open to turn off the 
tank heater. The intense heat in the tank damaged Teflon insulation on the fan motor wire. The later in-flight accident 
occurred when starting the fans in oxygen tank 2 caused an electrical short circuit through the damaged insulation on 
the fan motor wires and the insulation caught fire. The fire in oxygen tank 2 caused it to suddenly rupture and damage 
tank 1, causing it to also leak. 
The review board found that: 
"The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and 
demanding engineering development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both men and equipment 
must perform to near perfection. … the accident was not the result of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, but 
rather from an unusual combination of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat deficient and unforgiving design."8  
A test procedure mistake was made and not caught by review. The Apollo 13 failure was an illustration of the high 
technology failures that occur in complex systems.  
E. Apollo risk summary 
At the beginning of Apollo, its great difficulty and risk were obvious. Numerical estimates of the probability of 
success were given as either 3 in 30 or 5%. This awareness of risk led to great conservatism in defining the mission 
scenario and overall systems architecture. However, openly reporting the expected high risk was not politically 
feasible. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is 
reduced by “attention taken in design.” This design-oriented view that neglected use of probability numbers was 
carried forward from Apollo to Shuttle.  A NASA safety analysis for Galileo explained that Shuttle “relies on 
engineering judgment using rigid and well-documented design, configuration, safety, reliability, and quality assurance 
controls.” It was also thought that, with the attention given to safety and reliability, “standard failure rate data are 
pessimistic.”5  
The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the final Apollo approach to risk, which 
was to to avoid computing and reporting the probability of failure and to assume that good design would reduce risk 
far below previous experience. Neglecting the historical base rate is a well known fundamental flaw in prediction.10 
The Shuttle experience described later illustrates the predictive value of historical base rates.  
The success of Apollo was due to three things, the initial probabilistic awareness of high risk that led to 
conservative mission and architecture planning, diligent attention to design, and careful mission operations. Success 
requires attention to risk in planning, design, and operations, since neglecting risk in any phase can lead to failure. 
Following the later Apollo approach of deemphasizing risk led Shuttle into risky mission and architecture planning 
and to negligent operations, with tragic results.  
III. The Shuttle program 
The Space Shuttle was NASA’s next major human program after Apollo. The Shuttle transported cargo and crew 
to orbit from 1981 to 2011. There were 133 successful missions and two tragic failures. The Shuttle program 
mistakenly promised rapid turn around, frequent flights, and lower launch costs. But the worst mistake in Shuttle was 
believing that the Shuttle was safe.  
Shuttle was developed in a very different atmosphere than Apollo. The Apollo program had strong congressional 
support and an extremely large budget. “This meant that Administrator Webb did not have to ‘sell’ the program to his 
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political overseers with exaggerated claims or by acquiescing to unrealistic budget compromises. And so, the freedom 
of the agency to provide realistic cost estimates and enjoy relatively smooth relations with White House and Congress 
gave ‘NASA engineers a fighting chance to accomplish their mission without any cost overruns.’”11 12  
Developing the Shuttle in the 1970’s, NASA had to adjust to a new reality. It had been “above the wearisome 
battle for resources that typified other public enterprises.” Now it pushed the economy and jobs.12 NASA 
overpromised on what the Space Shuttle could accomplish on half the initial budget. It would pay for itself launching 
satellites and carrying out science experiments. The number of possible launches and the potential cost savings were 
greatly exaggerated.  
A. Denying risk in Shuttle 
Shuttle was politically unpopular and the program’s very existence was threatened. The initial design of the Shuttle 
emphasized capability and cost without mention of risk. “During the early Shuttle studies, there was a debate over the 
optimal Shuttle design that best balanced capability, development cost, and operational cost.”13 There was a need for 
over-optimistic advocacy. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. 
… One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. 
… Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.”5  
The risk of Space Shuttle was generally neglected. “Although every knowledgeable observer recognized that there 
was some potential for a major Shuttle failure, the press and the broader public in the early 1980s paid little attention 
to the risks of human spaceflight. Even those close to the Shuttle system let down their guard. As one successful 
launch followed another, some engineers and flight directors began to submerge their concerns about troublesome 
items that lay on the critical path to a safe launch.”14  
Following the final Apollo neglect of risk, top level mission and system wide PRA was avoided. The Space Shuttle 
risk assessments were all qualitative at the system level. They included preliminary hazards analysis, failure modes 
and effects analysis with critical items list, and various safety assessments. There was some quantitative analysis 
conducted for specific subsystems.5 The Space Shuttle requirements for safety were too simplistic. Subsystems were 
to “fail-operational after the failure of (the) most critical component” and to “fail-safe for crew survival the failure of 
(the) two most critical components.”15  
Safety was simply assumed rather than designed into the Shuttle.  
 “The final shortcoming was that the Shuttle was designed as if it had the inherent operating safety of an airliner. It was 
not equipped with any provision for crew rescue in case of booster failure during ascent to orbit, or being stranded in 
orbit, or structural failure during re-entry. The crew was not even provided with spacesuits, despite the lessons of the 
Soviet space program. This seemed an extraordinary act of engineering hubris, given that contemporary military aircraft 
were equipped with pressure suits and ejection seats. But the weight problem also meant that there was no margin for 
crew safety measures without (to NASA) unacceptable impact to the net payload. … Following the Columbia disaster, 
NASA finally realized it could not make the Shuttle safe. The only way to continue American manned spaceflight would 
be to develop a replacement manned spacecraft with an escape system, and meanwhile fly the Shuttle as little as 
possible.”16  
B. NASA Shuttle PRA’s 
Three PRA’s were done on Shuttle. PRA was required because Shuttle was to be used to launch Galileo to Jupiter, 
and Galileo contained plutonium in a thermonuclear generator which could be dispersed by an accident. The first 
contractor study done for NASA found the risk of losing a Shuttle during launch was between 1 chance in 1,000 and 
1 in 10, 000. The greatest risk was in the solid-fuel rocket boosters, which had a failure rate of about 1 in 40. However, 
rather than use the historical data, the NASA sponsor made an “engineering judgment” and “decided to assume a 
failure probability of 1 in 1,000” or even 1 in 10,000.5  
A second study for the Air Force noted that the earlier study involved both gathering failure data “and the 
disregarding of that data and arbitrary assignment of risk levels apparently per sponsor direction” with “no quantitative 
justification at all.” After reanalyzing the data, the study found that the boosters’ track record “suggest[s] a failure rate 
of around one-in-a-hundred.” 5  
NASA Johnson Space Center conducted its own internal safety analysis for Galileo in 1985. The Johnson authors 
went through failure mode worksheets assigning probability levels. A failure in the solid rocket booster (the failure 
that destroyed Challenger) was assigned a probability of 1 in 100,000. 5  
Even after the Challenger accident, the NASA chief engineer in a hearing on the Galileo thermonuclear generator 
said: “We think that using a number like 10 to the minus 3, as suggested, is probably a little pessimistic.” He thought 
the actual risk “would be 10 to the minus 5.” The number was derived “based on engineering judgment.” 5  
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C. Challenger 
The Challenger broke up at 73 seconds into flight when an O-ring in the right solid rocket booster failed and 
allowed a flare to reach the external fuel tank, which separated so that aerodynamic forces disintegrated the Shuttle. 
The crew cabin hit the ocean at unsurvivable speed at 2 minutes and 45 seconds after the breakup.  
NASA’s internal investigation was initially conducted in secrecy and was suspected of covering up relevant 
information. The presidentially appointed Rogers Commission identified failure causes in NASA's management 
culture and decision-making processes.  
“testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in a decision to launch (Challenger) based on incomplete and 
sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA 
management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.”17  
The flaw in the O-ring design and the potential for flare blow-by had been known for many years but had been 
ignored and the risk improperly minimized. This has been labeled “normalization of deviance.”18 Before the flight, 
engineers had warned about the danger of launching in much colder than previously experienced temperatures.  
The Nobel physicist Richard Feynman provided “Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle” as an appendix 
to the Rogers Commission report on the Challenger accident.  
“It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of 
human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The higher figures come from the working 
engineers, and the very low figures from management. …An estimate of the reliability of solid rockets was made by the 
range safety officer, by studying the experience of all previous rocket flights. Out of a total of nearly 2,900 flights, 121 
failed (1 in 25). ... NASA officials argue that the figure is much lower. They point out that these figures are for unmanned 
rockets but since the Shuttle is a manned vehicle ‘the probability of mission success is necessarily very close to 1.0.’ … It 
would appear that, for whatever purpose, be it for internal or external consumption, the management of NASA 
exaggerates the reliability of its product, to the point of fantasy.17  
The neglect of O-ring and tile damage, the normalization of deviance, and the fantastic exaggeration of Shuttle 
reliability are well documented. 17 18 19 There is an even more obvious but usually unmentioned reason for the failures 
of Shuttle. The Space Shuttle simply was not designed to minimize risk. Unlike the hardened Apollo capsule, the 
Shuttle crew compartment was fragile, unlike the Apollo command module, the Shuttle crew compartment was next 
to rather than above the dangerous rockets, and unlike Apollo, the Shuttle had no launch abort system. These design 
errors can be considered the root causes of the Challenger and Columbia accidents. These early fundamental design 
errors have been deemphasized in favor of blaming operational people who by extraordinary action might have beaten 
the bad odds. These design errors are implicitly acknowledged by the fact that NASA’s post Shuttle rocket and crew 
vehicle designs replicate the Apollo approach.  
In response to the Rogers Commission's recommendations, NASA redesigned the solid rocket boosters and created 
a new Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance reporting directly to the administrator.  
In her investigation of the Challenger disaster, Diane Vaughan found that, because of difficult goals and limited 
resources, NASA’s Apollo safety culture became a “culture of production” that emphasized productivity, efficiency, 
obeying orders and following rules rather than problem solving or concern about safety. The result was “the 
normalization of deviance,” the acceptance of what should have been alarming indications of incipient failure. Blocked 
communications, Vaughan’s “structural secrecy,” prevented effective action.18   
Initial qualitative assessments of Shuttle reliability were based on expert judgment rather than reliability analysis. 
After Challenger, PRA was adopted and applied to the Space Shuttle, space station, and some unmanned space 
missions. NASA then developed realistic estimates of probability of Space Shuttle failure, roughly 1 in 100.20  
D. Columbia 
The Columbia astronauts perished when the Shuttle heat shield failed on reentry. The Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (CAIB) reported: 
“The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the leading 
edge of the left wing, caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod ramp … and struck the 
wing ... During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the 
leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in … break-up of the 
Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no 
possibility for the crew to survive. … The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle 
Program’s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, 
subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as 
operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and 
organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute 
for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with 
requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled 
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professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an 
informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization’s rules.19  
The physical cause of the Columbia tragedy was identified and it was noted that the Shuttle design provided no 
crew escape and no possibility for the crew to survive. The CAIB’s emphasis was on the organizational practices 
detrimental to safety, the barriers that prevent communication of critical safety information, the lack of integrated 
management, and the informal chain of command that were immediate contributors to the failure. The goal of the 
prescribed independent program technical authority, the independent safety assurance organization, and the learning 
organization culture is to “more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle.”  
The CAIB found that the post-Challenger changes in NASA management and culture were ineffective.  
 “(T)he Rogers Commission … recommendations centered on an underlying theme: the lack of independent safety 
oversight at NASA. … NASA’s response to the Rogers Commission recommendation did not meet the Commission’s 
intent: the Associate Administrator did not have direct authority, and safety, reliability, and mission assurance activities 
across the agency remained dependent on other programs and Centers for funding.”19  
The CAIB believed that Columbia and Challenger were both lost because of similar failures in NASA’s 
organizational system. “(T)he causes of the institutional failure responsible for Challenger have not been fixed.”19 
NASA during Apollo had a good safety culture but lost it before Shuttle. NASA had lost the ability to recognize and 
repair threats that were obvious in hindsight.21  
Interestingly, the CAIB evaluated NASA’s performance using the two well known theories of reliability and 
failure. The CAIB observed that “Though neither High Reliability Theory nor Normal Accident Theory is entirely 
appropriate for understanding this accident, insights from each figured prominently in the Boardʼs deliberation.”19 The 
CAIB found that organizational changes could “minimize risk and limit the number of accidents.”19 It noted that one 
individual, the Shuttle program manager, was responsible for achieving safe, timely launches at acceptable costs and 
so a compromise of safety was expected no matter who was in the position. The CAIB recommended that 
“responsibility and authority for decisions involving technical requirements and safety should rest with an independent 
technical authority.”19 The GAO recently found that NASA’s commercial crew program has still not implemented the 
separation of programmatic and safety authority that was recommended in the CAIB report. “(T)he program’s chief 
safety and mission assurance officer is dual hatted to serve simultaneously in a programmatic position as well as the 
program’s safety technical authority. This approach creates an environment of competing interests.22   
The CAIB concluded, "The Shuttle is now an aging system but still developmental in character. It is in the nation's 
interest to replace the Shuttle as soon as possible."19  
E. Shuttle risk summary 
The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a conspicuous case of management failure. The focus is on the 
Challenger launch decision. The immediate cause is usually described as a last minute failure of communication, 
leading to the inability of engineers to have their O-ring concerns heard and acted on. The longer term organizational 
cause is the gradual “normalization of deviance,” when safety issues gradually became neglected due to a production 
culture and short launch schedules. The cure would be a management led culture change, emphasizing safety in Shuttle 
operations.18 19 The real problem has been mistaken. The true fundamental cause of the Challenger and Columbia 
disasters occurred decades earlier.  
The design of the Shuttle design produced a system that was excessively and unnecessarily dangerous. The Space 
Shuttle simply was not designed for minimum risk. Unlike the hardened Apollo capsule head shield, the Shuttle crew 
compartment used fragile tiles, unlike the Apollo crew module, the Shuttle crew compartment was next to rather than 
above the dangerous rockets, and unlike Apollo, the Shuttle had no launch abort system. These design errors directly 
led to the Challenger and Columbia accidents. These early fundamental design errors are deemphasized in favor of 
blaming operational people who with luck and diligence might have beaten the high probability of a failure. These 
design errors are implicitly acknowledged by the fact that the current rocket and crew vehicle designs are similar to 
the safer design configuration of Apollo, with a hardened crew capsule, the crew capsule above the rocket and fuel, 
and a launch abort system.  
One reason that the Space Shuttle was not designed for minimum risk is that probabilistic risk analysis was not 
used in its initial design. The probability of failure was not computed for the alternate designs and not compared to 
traditional expendable rockets. Although risk analysis had helped improve Apollo safety, it was abandoned as too 
negative during later Apollo development and was thought too pessimistic after the success of Apollo. A high 
probability of failure was built into the Shuttle design, but this was not generally realized until after Challenger.  
The sequence of events leading to the Shuttle tragedies and responses began decades earlier during the Apollo era. 
Risk analysis was abandoned during Apollo in favor of engineering design for reliability. The Shuttle was designed 
without explicit mathematical consideration of risk. Choices were made to improve performance and reduce cost that 
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inadvertently increased risk. When the statistically predictable failures occurred, the failure investigations focused on 
the lowest organizational level and the last moments when the tragedies could have been avoided by some 
extraordinary saving action. Although some design changes were made, the Shuttle design was largely fixed, and the 
main recommendations were to improve NASA organization, culture, and operations. And yet the ultimate cause of 
the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid the negative impact of risk 
analysis. This was deemed necessary to avoid damaging the Apollo program. Other aspects of Shuttle advocacy, such 
as projecting an impossibly high number of flights to justify projected launch cost savings, also show distortions 
justified by political necessity. Ultimately, it was generally accepted that the Shuttle was too risky to continue to fly 
and the program was cancelled.  
IV. Conclusion 
The risk to safety should always be a major concern in human space flight. NASA’s attitude toward risk was very 
different at different times in Apollo and Space Shuttle. The Apollo program expected that many lives would 
inevitably be lost. Because of this, Apollo planned its mission and built its systems to minimize risk. Nevertheless, 
the danger of a pure oxygen atmosphere and the possibility of a fire were casually ignored and the tragic Apollo 1 fire 
occurred. Responsive efforts created a safety culture. The Apollo 13 near tragedy occurred because an incorrectly 
planned test damaged an oxygen tank, but Apollo 1 was the only fatal accident.  
The amazingly favorable safety record of Apollo led to overconfidence, ignoring risk, and inevitable disasters in 
Shuttle. The earlier emphasis on safety risk analysis was forgotten by the Shuttle program. High risk choices were 
made that directly lead to the later Shuttle fatalities. The crew cabin used fragile tiles rather than a strong heat shield. 
The crew cabin was placed next to rather than above the rocket engines. The launch abort system was eliminated. 
NASA management believed and testified to Congress that the Shuttle was very safe, with a 1 in 100,000 chance of 
an accident.  
The devastating loss of Challenger let to drastic reassessments. Risk analysis was restored. The actual chance of 
an accident was 1 in 100, not the originally claimed 1 in 100,000. The Challenger investigation faulted the Challenger 
launch decision, which due to the urgency to launch, ignored concerns about the rocket booster O-ring failure that 
caused the accident. Future Shuttle missions were mostly restricted to building the space station. The much later 
Columbia accident was thought to echo Challenger, since once again the failure signs and warnings were ignored.  
The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. NASA’s latest Apollo-
like designs directly reverse the risky choices of Shuttle. The crew capsule with heat shield is placed above the rockets 
and a launch abort system will be provided.  
This brief overview suggests two observations. First, the most important thing is the organization’s attention to 
risk. To achieve high reliability and safety, risk must always be a prime concern. Second, the risk to safety must be 
considered and minimized as far as possible at every step of a program, through mission planning, systems design, 
testing, and operations. At any time and place, some safety risk can be introduced or an existing one ignored. Everyone 
in a program should be constantly alert for potential risks, even outside their own responsibility. In a safety culture, 
any anomaly, even a temporary sensor glitch, is traced to its cause, understood, and corrected, no matter what.  
 Intuitively people often think that a mission is like a chain of many links. Any link can fail. The weakest links are 
top priority and improving others is wasted effort. This works well enough, but risk analysis provides a better insight. 
If there are many causes of failure, the overall probability of failure is the sum of all the failure rates, not the highest 
individual failure rate. Risk is a resource to be capped and optimized. The risk budget sets how much to spend. 
Optimization accepts risk in the most cost-effective way. If the biggest risk is too difficult and expensive to reduce, a 
smaller risk might be reduced more cheaply, and the overall risk reduced at less cost.  
Different program phases require different risk reduction reduction methods. Defining the mission scenario and 
system architecture can benefit from Probabilistic Risk Analysis. System design can use engineering judgment and 
safety design techniques. During operations, failure reporting and anomaly investigation are important.  
A short sighted accident investigation would tend to blame the people closest to the accident. It is true that whatever 
the design problems, a lucky and skillful operator might save the day. The Shuttle investigations found a bad safety 
culture affected launch decisions. The Shuttle itself was a given, so its intrinsic high risk was ignored as the 
fundamental cause of the accidents. The true cause of the Shuttle tragedies was a negligent high risk design.  
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